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On January 23, 2020, China quarantined Wuhan to con-
tain coronavirus disease (COVID-19). We estimated the 
probability of transportation of COVID-19 from Wuhan to 
369 other cities in China before the quarantine. Expected 
COVID-19 risk is >50% in 130 (95% CI 89–190) cities and 
>99% in the 4 largest metropolitan areas.
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In December 2019, a novel coronavirus, since named severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2, emerged in Wuhan, China (1), causing a 
respiratory illness that the World Health Organiza-
tion has named coronavirus disease (COVID-19). On 
January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization 
declared the outbreak a public health emergency of 
international concern (2). By January 31, 2020, a to-
tal of 192 fatalities and 3,215 laboratory-confirmed 
cases had been reported in Wuhan; 8,576 additional 
cases were spread across >300 cities in mainland 
China, and 127 exported cases were reported in 
23 countries spanning Asia, Europe, Oceania, and 
North America. The rapid global expansion, rising 
fatalities, unknown animal reservoir, and evidence 
of person-to-person transmission potential (3,4) ini-
tially resembled the 2003 SARS epidemic and raised 
concerns about global spread.
On January 22, 2020, China announced a travel 
quarantine of Wuhan and by January 30 expanded 
the radius to include 16 cities, encompassing a pop-
ulation of 45 million. At the time of the quarantine, 
China was already 2 weeks into the 40-day Spring 
Festival, during which residents and visitors make 
several billion trips throughout China to celebrate 
1These first authors contributed equally to this article.
the Lunar New Year (5). Considering the timing of 
exported COVID-2019 cases reported outside of 
China, we estimate that only 8.95% (95% credibil-
ity interval [CrI] 2.22%–28.72%) of persons infected 
in Wuhan by January 12 might have had COVID-19 
confirmed by January 22. By limiting our estimate 
to infections occurring ≥10 days before the quaran-
tine, we account for an ≈5–6-day incubation period 
and 4–5 days between symptom onset and case de-
tection (Appendix, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/26/5/20-0146-App1.pdf) (2–4,6). The low de-
tection rate coupled with an average lag of 10 days be-
tween infection and detection (7) suggest that newly 
infected persons who traveled out of Wuhan just be-
fore the quarantine might have remained infectious 
and undetected in dozens of cities in China for days 
to weeks. Moreover, these silent importations already 
might have seeded sustained outbreaks that were not 
immediately apparent.
We estimated the probability of transporta-
tion of infectious COVID cases from Wuhan to cit-
ies throughout China before January 23 by using a 
simple model of exponential growth coupled with a 
stochastic model of human mobility among 369 cit-
ies in China (Appendix). Given that ≈98% of all trips 
taken during this period were made by train or car, 
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Figure. Risks for transportation of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) from Wuhan, China, before a quarantine was imposed on January 23, 
2020. A) Daily travel volume to and from Wuhan, given as a percentage of the Wuhan population. Gray shading indicates the start of Spring 
Festival season on January 10, 2020, a peak travel period in China. B) Estimated and reported daily prevalence of COVID-19 in Wuhan. The 
green line and shading indicate model estimates of cumulative cases since December 1, 2019, with 95% credible interval bounds, assuming 
an epidemic doubling time of 7.31 days (95% credible interval 6.26–9.66 days). Black dots indicate cumulative confirmed case counts during 
January 1–22, 2020 (10). Gray shading at right indicates the start of Spring Festival season. C) Probability that >1 COVID-19 case infected in 
Wuhan traveled to cities in China by January 22, 2020. The 131 cities with a risk threshold >50% are indicated in shades of orange; 239 cities 
below that threshold are indicated in shades of blue. Map generated by using Mapbox (https://www.mapbox.com).
our analysis of air, rail, and road travel data yields 
more granular risk estimates than possible with air 
passenger data alone (8).
By fitting our epidemiologic model to data on 
the first 19 cases reported outside of China, we esti-
mate an epidemic doubling time of 7.31 days (95% CrI 
6.26–9.66 days) and a cumulative total of 12,400 (95% 
CrI 3,112–58,465) infections in Wuhan by January 22 
(Appendix). Both estimates are consistent with a sim-
ilar epidemiologic analysis of the first 425 cases con-
firmed in Wuhan (4). Assuming these rates of early 
epidemic growth, we estimate that 130 cities in China 
have a >50% chance of having a COVID case import-
ed from Wuhan in the 3 weeks preceding the quaran-
tine (Figure). By January 26, a total of 107 of these 130 
high-risk cities had reported cases. However, 23 had 
not, including 5 cities with importation probabilities 
>99% and populations >2 million: Bazhong, Fushun, 
Laibin, Ziyang, and Chuxiong. 
Under our lower bound estimate of 6.26 days for 
the doubling time, 190/369 cities lie above the 50% 
threshold for importation. Our risk assessment iden-
tified several cities throughout China likely to be har-
boring yet undetected cases of COVID-19 a week af-
ter the quarantine, suggesting that early 2020 ground 
and rail travel seeded cases far beyond the Wuhan 
region under quarantine.
Our conclusions are based on several key as-
sumptions. To design our mobility model, we used 
data from Tencent (https://heat.qq.com), a major so-
cial media company that hosts applications including 
WeChat (≈1.13 billion active users in 2019) and QQ 
(≈808 million active users in 2019) (Statista, https://
www.statista.com); consequently, our model might 
be demographically biased by the Tencent user base. 
Further, considerable uncertainty regarding the lag 
between infection and case detection remains. Our 
assumption of a 10-day lag is based on early esti-
mates for the incubation period of COVID-19 (4) and 
prior estimates of the lag between symptom onset 
and detection for SARS (9). We expect that estimates 
for the doubling time and incidence of COVID-19 
will improve as reconstructed linelists and more 
granular epidemiologic data become available (Ap-
pendix). However, our key qualitative insights likely 
are robust to these uncertainties, including extensive 
prequarantine exportations throughout China and far 
greater case counts in Wuhan than those reported be-
fore the quarantine.
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In January 2020, we investigated a 2-family cluster of persons infected with severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in the city of 
Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province, China. We attributed 
the infections to contact with an infected but poten-
tially presymptomatic traveler from the city of Wuhan 
in Hubei Province. Our epidemiologic investigation 
was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Commit-
tee of the Zhoushan Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC).
The initial 2 cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection 
(coronavirus disease [COVID-19]) in Zhoushan 
were diagnosed in 2 teachers (persons A and D) 
from the same department at a college that had 
sponsored an academic conference on January 5, 
2020. A 45-year-old teacher from Wuhan (person 
W) arrived on January 5 for the conference and 
joined persons A and D on January 6 for dinner, 
where they ate from common serving plates. After 
returning to Wuhan on January 7, person W expe-
rienced the onset of fever, cough, sore throat, and 
malaise on January 8. He visited a local hospital 
where, according to the patient’s self-report, he 
was confirmed to have COVID-19 by a local office 
of the Chinese CDC. For person A and D, the only 
known potential exposures for SARS-CoV-2 were 
their dinner and conference attendance with person 
W (Figure).
On January 10, person A (a 29-year-old man) 
experienced the onset of fever, cough, and skin tin-
gling and went to a local hospital for treatment. Lab-
oratory tests at the hospital indicated leukopenia, 
and a real-time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR) 
test for influenza A and B viruses was negative. The 
patient was given an antipyretic and some tradi-
tional medicines commonly used in China. After 3 
days, his fever subsided, but his cough persisted. On 
January 15, the patient went to a different hospital, 
where routine blood test results were unremarkable 
but a chest radiograph revealed bilateral invasive le-
sions. He was prescribed amoxicillin and levofloxa-
cin for 3 days. Because his cough did not improve, 
he was hospitalized for further evaluation. When the 
treating physician learned that the patient had had 
contact with a visitor from Wuhan before symptom 
onset, a throat swab specimen was sent for rRT-PCR 
testing for SARS-CoV-2 (1). On January 19, SARS-
CoV-2 infection was confirmed at the laboratory of 
the Zhoushan CDC.
Person A lived with his 28-year-old wife (per-
son B) and his 21-year-old sister (person C). The 2 
women were confined at home for 14 days starting 
on the day of person A’s hospital admission. Be-
cause of their 10 days of contact with person A after 
his fever onset, their respiratory specimens were 
collected on January 20 by Zhoushan CDC staff for 
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We report a 2-family cluster of persons infected with se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in the city 
of Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province, China, during January 
2020. The infections resulted from contact with an infect-
ed but potentially presymptomatic traveler from the city of 
Wuhan in Hubei Province.
1These first authors contributed equally to this article.
